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REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
INTRODUCTION
In May 1982, the spectacular failure of Drysdale Government Se-
curities, Inc. (Drysdale) rocked the government securities markets.'
Drysdale was a participant in the highly-sophisticated repurchase
market,2 and its default raised the long-dormant issue whether a
repurchase agreement (repo) is a sale or a secured loan. 3 A repurchase
agreement consists of a sale of a security coupled with a simultaneous
1. See Bennett, Securities Firms and the Risk of Failure, N.Y. Times, May 19,
1982, at D4, col. 1; Wall St. J., May 19, 1982, at 2, col. 1. Drysdale defaulted on an
approximately $300 million payment of accrued interest on government securities
held pursuant to repurchase agreements. Disturbances in the U.S. Securities Market:
Hearing on Recent Developments in the U.S. Government Securities Markets Arising
from Default by Drysdale Government Securities, Inc. Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1982) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato, Subcomm. Chairman) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearing]; Welles, Drysdale: What Really Happened, Institutional Inves-
tor, Sept. 1982, at 73.
Government securities consist of Treasury obligations, United States government
securities and United States government-sponsored securities. See Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(16) (1982). The government securities market
is one of the largest capital markets in the world. Welles, supra, at 74; see W.
Sharpe, Investments 193 (1978) ("U.S. Treasury is omnipresent in the capital mar-
ket"). The market may be broken down into the primary market for the sale of new
issues, the secondary market for trading, and the repurchase market in which the
securities essentially serve as collateral for short-term loans. See Senate Hearing,
supra, at 3-4 (testimony of Mark Stalnecker, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't
of the Treasury).
2. Welles, supra note 1, at 81; Wall St. J., May 19, 1982, at 2, col. 1. Although
Drysdale was a recent entrant in the market, the firm was able to use its capital base
of $20.8 million to create gross positions as high as $20 billion. Welles, supra note 1,
at 79, 81. The specific market practice that led to Drysdale's default related to the
pricing of securities obtained in a transaction. The firm utilized "flat pricing" which
does not include in either the original or the repurchase price the interest accrued on
the securities between coupon dates. Id. at 80. The suppliers of securities, therefore,
extended too much margin. In effect, Drysdale was able to receive a $300 million
unsecured loan. Id. at 74. Drysdale used this money to cover its trading losses. See id.
at 80. In response to the Drysdale failure, common practice has shifted to include
accrued interest in the pricing. M. Stigum, The Money Market 402-03 (rev. ed.
1983); Public Securities Association, A Survey of the Repurchase Agreement Market 8
(1982) [hereinafter cited as PSA Survey].
3. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing on Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe-
line Co. Decision; Consumer Credit Code Amendments; Agricultural Produce Bail-
ment Amendments; Repurchase Agreement Code Amendments; Shopping Center
Tenancy Amendments; and Timesharing Agreements Amendments Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 517-18
(1983) (statement of Investment Company Institute) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy
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agreement by the original seller to repurchase the security at a later
date for a specified higher price. 4 Although the parties to a repo
typically characterize it as a sale,5 it may be viewed as a secured loan
for the period between the sale and the repurchase with the price
differential considered interest7 and the security considered collat-
eral.8
Reform Hearing]; Welles, supra note 1, at 74, 78; Golub, Eisenberg & Hoene,
Memorandum to the Investment Company Institute, Bankruptcy Implications for
"Repo" Transactions 1-2 (Aug. 3, 1982) (default raised questions about legal status)
(available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Impli-
cations]; Letter from Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, to Hon. John Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm'n 3-4
(June 15, 1982) (same) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited
as Rosenthal Letter]; Letter of Thomas Russo, Esq., to Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board 2 (June 4, 1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Russo Letter]. Market participants deliberately left the issue
unresolved allowing them to characterize the repo to suit their purposes. M. Stigum,
supra note 2, at 398. For example, state and local governments may have the
authority to buy and sell securities, but not to borrow or lend funds. See id. at 422;
Memorandum of Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. in Opposition to the Debtor's
Application for Injunctive Relief and in Support of its Crossclaim for Declaratory
Judgment at 5, 12, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 1982) (evading restrictions on loans with private parties) [hereinafter cited
as Dauphin Memorandum]. These governmental units would therefore be inclined to
characterize a repo as a sale. Id. at 3-5. Thrift institutions, on the other hand, would
characterize a repo as a loan so that they would not have to mark down the book
value of the securities to market value. Application for Order Approving Settlements
of Outstanding Reverse Repurchase Agreements Between Lombard-Wall, Inc. and
Talman Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Illinois, St. Paul Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n of Chicago, Dry Dock Savings Bank and Midwest Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis at 3, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1982).
4. First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 324 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1981); Cosmo-
politan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 507 F. Supp. 954, 956
(S.D. Fla. 1981); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); M. Stigum,
supra note 2, at 41; Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 2.
5. Hirschberg, Issues Which Frequently Arise In Structuring and Documenting
Commercial Repurchase Transactions, in Practising Law Institute, Repurchase and
Reverse Repurchase Agreements 213, 215 (1982) (Course Handbook Series No. 290).
See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
6. Extract of Minutes at 3, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982, 6 P.M.); M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 417; Bankruptcy
Implications, supra note 3, at 20.
7. S. Goldfeld & L. Chandler, The Economics of Money and Banking 462 (8th ed.
1981); L. Ritter & W. Silber, Principles of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets
118 n.1 (3d ed. 1980); see Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 20.
8. See L. Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 7, at 118 n.1; M. Stigum, supra note 2, at
417; Welles, supra note 1, at 78; Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 20. See
infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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In October 1982, Lombard-Wall, Inc., another securities dealer,
failed and a bankruptcy court ruled that a repurchase agreement is a
secured loan and the securities are merely collateral. 9 Accordingly,
when an original seller of securities goes bankrupt, the securities are
property of the estate-in-bankruptcy,' l and under the Bankruptcy
Code's (Code) automatic stay provision, these securities cannot be sold
to satisfy the security interest.'I This inability to liquidate subjects the
bankrupt's counterparty, the original purchaser of the securities, to
the risk of principal and interest loss, substantial illiquidity, and even
bankruptcy.' 2 These effects could easily spread and severely disrupt
the market. 13
9. Extract of Minutes at 3, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982, 6 P.M.); see Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at
337 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Ag6ncy Sec. Div.
of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n); PSA Survey, supra note 2, at 2. The counterparties to the
transaction had threatened to liquidate the securities. Application for Order Prohi-
biting Disposal of Securities Under Repurchase Agreements and Investor Agreements
at 1, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Application Order]. Accordingly, Lombard-Wall requested a
temporary restraining order. Id. The court granted this request. In re Lombard-
Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1982) (temporary restraining
order).
10. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982). See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. A
preliminary issue is whether the Code governs the liquidation or reorganization of
the bankrupt entity. This Note presumes the applicability of the Code.
12. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 341 (statement of Thomas
W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency See. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n)
(capital tied up); Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, to Hon. Robert J. Dole, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 20, 1983) (risk of capital loss) [hereinafter
cited as Volcker Letter I], reprinted in Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at
305; Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (remarks of Sen. D'Amato, Subcomm.
Chairman) (counterparties could have failed); id. at 25 (statement of Anthony Solo-
mon, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.) (capital tied up); Rosenthal Letter,
supra note 3, at 4 (loss of interest and principal); Letter from Paul A. Volcker,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Hon. Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 2 (Jan. 20, 1983) (risk of
capital loss) [hereinafter cited as Volcker Letter II]. Prior to the Lombard-Wall
ruling, which did not permit liquidation of the securities, market participants had
assumed they could liquidate securities immediately on default. M. Stigum, supra
note 2, at 421; see Volcker Letter I, supra, reprinted in Bankruptcy Reform Hearing,
supra note 3, at 305; Supplemental Memorandum of the Investment Company
Institute as Amicus Curiae at 5, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Oct. 8,
1982) [hereinafter cited as ICI Supplemental Memorandum]. The Lombard-Wall
ruling transformed this view of repos as essentially riskless transactions. See M.
Stigum, supra note 2, at 421. The risk in the transaction now depends not only on the
quality of the underlying securities but also on the creditworthiness of the counter-
part. See Letter from W. Dennis Thomas, Ass't Sec'y (Legislative Affairs), Dep't of
the Treasury, to Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce,
[Vol. 52
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The repo market plays an important role in the nation's economy.
The Federal Reserve uses repos to implement monetary policy. 14 Gov-
ernment securities dealers finance their portfolios with repos.15 Mu-
tual funds, state and local governments, corporations, and other insti-
tutions find repos an attractive investment for idle cash balances.'
6
Thus, the flexibility of repos as to duration and amount serves the
liquidity needs of a broad array of market participants. 17 Because the
underlying securities in a repo are typically of high quality, repos used
to be considered virtually risk-free. '8 The Lombard-Wall ruling intro-
duced uncertainty about the Code's treatment of repos that makes risk
management by market participants more difficult and contributes to
a contraction of the repo market. '
Part I of this Note explores the ramifications under the Code of the
alternative characterizations of a repo. Part II discusses the elements
of a repurchase agreement, the function and structure of the repur-
chase market, and the character of the transaction. This Part con-
cludes that under the Code a repurchase agreement is likely to be
treated as a secured loan. Part III examines proposed legislation that
would limit the impact of the Code's automatic stay provision, and
supports the legislation with minor modification;
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations
1 (June 4, 1982). Predictably, the repo rate has risen to account for this added risk.
Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 306 (statement of Peter Sternlight,
Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.). Moreover, there has been a
reluctance to enter into transactions with smaller dealers, thus removing some of
them from the market. This reduces liquidity in the market. See PSA Survey, supra
note 2, at 6.
13. Volcker Letter I, supra note 12, reprinted in Bankruptcy Reform Hearing,
supra note 3, at 305; Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Sen. D'Amato,
Subcomm. Chairman); id. at 36 (statement of Anthony Solomon, President, Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Russo Letter, supra note 3, at 1; see Bankruptcy Reform
Hearing, supra note 3, at 341 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't
and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n); Welles, supra note 1, at 74.
14. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
18. M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 421; see Volcker Letter I, supra note 12, reprinted
in Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 305.
19. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 306 (testimony of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.). The unsettled state
of the law has also made it difficult for market participants to negotiate written
repurchase agreements. PSA Survey, supra note 2, at 7; Survey of Repo Market
Shows Major Structural Changes and Widespread Problems Caused by Delay in
Bankruptcy Law Changes (Draft News Release prepared by Public Securities Ass'n




I. BANKRUPTCY CODE CONSEQUENCES
Either party in a repo might go bankrupt. The consequences for the
counterparty will vary according to how a repo is characterized. The
consequences also depend on whether the counterparty is the buyer-
lender, who has originally supplied funds for the securities, or the
seller-borrower, who has exchanged his securities for the funds.
If a repo is characterized as a sale, the agreement to repurchase the
security is an executory contract because performance remains due on
both sides.20 The trustee-in-bankruptcy generally may assume or re-
ject any executory contract.2 1 To assume the repo, the trustee would
first have to cure any default by tendering either the securities or the
repurchase price, depending on whether the bankrupt was the buyer-
lender or the seller-borrower.2 2 The counterparty is nonetheless pre-
sented with a number of practical problems. If the trustee rejects the
contract, the estate remains liable for contract damages,2 3 but the
claim for the difference between the repurchase price and the market
value of the securities is unsecured and might prove worthless.2 4 More-
over, the trustee's ability to delay before deciding whether to assume
or reject the contract2 s allows the trustee to speculate at the counter-
party's risk. For example, if the bankrupt is the seller-borrower, the
trustee will reject the contract to repurchase if the market price of the
securities falls below the repurchase price. If the bankrupt is the
20. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
1977 House Report], reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6303;
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Proceedings of the Banking, Corporation and Business Law
Section 35 (Apr. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Bar Proceedings]; Bankruptcy Implica-
tions, supra note 3, at 15. Even under a secured-loan characterization, there is
arguably an executory contract because the lender must return the collateral in
exchange for cash. See id. at 15. It appears, however, that secured loans are not to be
treated as executory contracts. See In re Sparago, 31 Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983) (secured car loan not executory contract); In re Whatley, 16 Bankr.
394, 397-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (same).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982); Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 15.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982); Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 15-16.
One could argue that the importance of timely performance for repo transactions
makes default incurable. See ICI Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 13.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2) (1982); Bar Proceedings, supra note 20, at 35. The
counterparty has a claim for breach of contract at the time of commencement of the
case. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2) (1982). The case commences on the filing of the petition
for bankruptcy. Id. §§ 301-304.
24. See J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform
Commercial Code 993 (2d ed. 1980); Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 27.
25. Bar Proceedings, supra note 20, at 35; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1982). In a
reorganization, the trustee has until the confirmation of the plan of reorganization,
but the counterparty may request the court to order an assumption or rejection
within a specified time period. Id. § 365(d)(2).
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buyer-lender, the trustee will resell the securities only if the repur-
chase price exceeds the market price. 26 The delay also destroys the
short-term nature of the transaction and undermines the market's
ability to provide a low-risk mechanism for cash management.2 7
The primary advantage to the market of a sale characterization is
that the buyer-lender may liquidate the securities in the event of
default by the seller-borrower. The trustee merely has a contract right
to purchase securities at a given price.28 Because this right is not an
interest in the securities, 2 the securities are not property of the estate,
and therefore, are not covered by the automatic stay provision.30
If a repo is characterized as a secured loan, however, the securities
are collateral and may not be liquidated by the buyer-lender. The
seller-borrower's interest in the securities would be property of the
estate.3' The automatic stay provision precludes any act to create,
26. See ICI Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 13-14; cf. Russo Let-
ter, supra note 3, at 2 (delay allows taking advantage of post-petition interest rules).
27. See ICI Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5 ("The ability to
redeem promptly, at net asset value, is crucial to the operation of [mutual] funds and
the maintenance of investor confidence."); Russo Letter, supra note 3, at 2 ("[D]elay
... may be catastrophic in an industry whose participants depend on the ability to
continue rolling over obligations."). Applying the executory-contract provision
would nonetheless be more favorable to the market than a loan characterization,
because the assumption or rejection of a contract is generally more expeditious than
the lifting of the automatic stay which requires the party seeking to lift the stay to
show cause. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982) (no need to show cause to force
trustee to assume or reject contract within specified time) with id. § 362(d)(1) (must
show cause to lift automatic stay); see In re Anderson, No. 83-0073 (Bankr. D.
Hawaii July 11, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Bkrtcy file) (automatic
stay not lifted but executory contract ordered assumed or rejected promptly).
28. Memorandum of the Investment Company Institute as Amicus Curiae in
Opposition to the Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 13-14, In re
Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as ICI Memorandum]; Amicus Brief submitted on behalf of Goldman, Sachs &
Co. and Salomon Brothers, Inc. in Opposition to the Debtor's Application for Injunc-
tive Relief at 17, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug.
22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Goldman Brief].
29. If the original transfer of securities is a sale, the seller-borrower has given up
all ownership rights. ICI Memorandum, supra note 28, at 12-14. Of course, the
contract right itself is intangible property of the estate. In re Plunkett, 23 Bankr. 392,
394 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982); In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, 12 Bankr. 989, 1004
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); ICI Memorandum, supra note 28, at 14.
30. Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 17. The buyer-lender may liquidate the
securities if they are not property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982).
Property of the estate includes all property in which the debtor had any legal or
equitable interest. Id. § 541(a)(1).
31. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of its Application for Injunctive
Relief at 2, In re Lombard-Wall, No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982);
see Bar Proceedings, supra note 20, at 33. Even if legal title passes in a repo, the
seller-borrower retains an equitable interest in the securities. The situation is analo-
1984]
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perfect or enforce any secured claim against property of the estate.32
Thus, the buyer-lender cannot liquidate the securities, despite the
seller-borrower's default. The buyer-lender may have the right to
have the stay lifted if the value of his collateral falls below the amount
of his secured claim 33 or he is threatened with irreparable harm."
Such relief, however, is uncertain and might not be obtained quickly
enough to protect the creditor from loss of principal and interest. 35
The automatic stay, on the other hand, would not affect a bankrupt
buyer-lender's counterparty, who would have free use of the funds
obtained through the repo.
The Code's "strong-arm" provision provides further protection to
the estate by giving the trustee the rights of a judicial lien creditor. 3
These rights will defeat the buyer-lender's security interest if it is
unperfected before the filing for bankruptcy, 37 leaving the buyer-
lender with a mere unsecured claim for the repurchase price. 3 Market
participants should follow appropriate procedures to perfect their
security interests to protect themselves against this consequence of a
secured loan characterization. 39
gous to an equitable mortgage where the borrower gives the lender a deed absolute in
form as security for the loan. Equity treats such a transaction as a mortgage and not a
sale. Warner v. Gosnell, 8 Il. 2d 24, 30-31, 132 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1956). The
intention of the parties determines the character of the transaction. Id.; Fry v. D.H.
Overmyer Co., 269 Or. 281, 292-93; 525 P.2d 140, 145-46 (1974). This note argues
that the intent of the parties is most accurately inferred from the economic substance
of the transaction which is a secured loan. See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying
text.
32. Richlands Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 34 Bankr. 749, 753 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983);
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982); see Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 20-21.
33. Standard Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Phelps (In re Chatman), 23 Bankr. 176,
178 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982); Bankruptcy Implications,
supra note 3, at 21-22.
34. General Elec. Credit v. Montgomery Mall Ltd. Partnership, 704 F.2d 1173,
1176 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 108 (1983); 11 U.S.C. § 362(f) (1982).
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as 1982
House Report], reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 583, 584; M. Stigum,
supra note 2, at 421-22; cf. Letter from Thomas A. Russo, Esq. to Rep. Benjamin S.
Rosenthal, Chairman, Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Gov't Operations 4 (July 20, 1982) (relief uncertain and would
entail substantial delay) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). But cf. Bank-
ruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 11 ("Bankruptcy courts usually act reasonably
promptly . ").
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982); Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at
19.
37. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 24, at 998; see 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)
(1982); U.C.C. § 9-301(b) (1977).
38. R. Hensen, Handbook on Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code 259 (2d ed. 1979).




The trustee also has the power to avoid preferential loan repay-
ments made up to ninety days prior to the filing for bankruptcy while
the debtor was insolvent. 40 One example of a preference is when
creditors take unusual action to enforce an unsecured claim or an
unperfected secured claim shortly prior to a filing in bankruptcy. 41
Thus, the following transfers may be avoidable as preferences: 1)
subsequent transfers of additional collateral; 42 2) repurchase of the
security, to the extent the repurchase price exceeds the market value at
the time of repurchase; 43 and 3) repurchase of the security, when the
buyer-lender's security interest is unperfected at the time of repur-
chase.44 Such transfers are typical of repo transactions. 45 Because the
transfers are made in the ordinary course of business, however, they
are excepted from avoidance as preferences. 46
Under a sale characterization, repos are governed by the executory
contracts provision, and the bankrupt's counterparties are at risk only
to the extent they are either oversecured seller-borrowers or underse-
cured buyer-lenders. A loan characterization also subjects a buyer-
lender to the risks of the application of the automatic stay, "strong-
arm," and preferences provisions. Determination of the proper
characterization accordingly is helpful to clarify the risk exposure of
repo participants.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982); see, e.g., In re Vance, 721 F.2d 259, 260 & n.1 (9th
Cir. 1983); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 985 & n.12 (1st Cir.
1983); Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981). But see 11
U.S.C. § 547(c) (1982) (exceptions to the general rule).
41. See In re Iowa Premium Serv. Co., 676 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 695 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1982); Barash v.
Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1981); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 88 [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Report], reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5874; 1977 House Report, supra note 20, at 373, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News at 6329.
42. See Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 32; Letter from Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz to its Clients 3 (May 26, 1982) (available in files of Fordham
Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Wachtell Letter].
43. See Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 30.
44. Payment of an unsecured loan is a preference unless it falls within one of the
exceptions to 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982). See In re Brent Exploration Co., 31 Bankr. 745,
752 (Bankr. D. Col. 1983).
45. See Bar Proceedings, supra note 20, at 23, 44. See infra notes 58, 67 and
accompanying text.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982); see In re Iowa Premium Serv. Co., 676 F.2d
1220, 1221, rev'd en banc on other grounds, 695 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1982); Barash v.
Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1981); Bankruptcy Implications,
supra note 3, at 18, 31. The repayment must be within forty-five days after the debt
was incurred. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1982). This requirement will usually not




II. CHARACTERIZING THE TRANSACTION
Several factors are relevant to the characterization of a repurchase
agreement. The economic substance of a repo and the form of the
agreement provide the most insight into the true nature of the transac-
tion. Bankruptcy policy and the impact on the securities markets must
also be considered.
A. Economic Substance and the Parties' Intent
In characterizing a repo transaction, courts consider whether the
parties intended to effect a sale or a secured loan.47 Repos are typically
oral agreements48 with mixed terminology. The securities are called
"collateral" 49 and the parties negotiate in terms of interest rates, 50
suggesting that a repo is a loan. The written confirmations of these
oral agreements, however, characterize a repo as a sale. 51 In order to
provide greater certainty in the treatment of repos, repo participants
have begun to utilize written "master" repurchase agreements to gov-
ern all transactions between the parties. 52 These master repurchase
agreements typically state that the parties intend the repo to be a
sale. 3 This sale characterization may be self-serving, however, con-
47. See First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1981);
Walters v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (In re Financial Corp.), 1 Bankr. 522, 526
n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1980). In Union
Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 827 (1970), however, subjective intent was held not to be decisive for tax
purposes.
48. Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 4; e.g., Walters v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. (In re Financial Corp.), 634 F.2d 404, 404 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 450 (5th Cir.) (tele-
phonic negotiations), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv.
Corp. v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 507 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(same).
49. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Affidavit in Support of
Motion to Vacate at 2, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Kurtz Affidavit]; M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 398-
99.
50. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); M. Stigum, supra note
2, at 399; see Kurtz Affidavit, supra note 49, at 2.
51. See Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 4, 20; Goldman Brief, supra
note 28, at 3; see Wachtell Letter, supra note 42, at 1. The parties' internal documen-
tation also provides some indication of intent. See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 & n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970);
Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Welles, supra note 1, at 78.
52. See M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 398, 422; Hirschberg, supra note 5, at 239-41;
PSA Survey, supra note 2, at 4.
53. See Salomon Brothers, General Repurchase Agreement 1-2 (1983) (available in
files of Fordham Law Review). It has been recommended that master agreements
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sidering the harsh impact of a loan characterization.. 4 The parties to
the transaction are sophisticated investors, 55 and their intent may be
more accurately discerned from the economic substance of the trans-
action. 6
The economic substance of the typical repurchase agreement
strongly supports a secured-loan characterization. 57 The seller retains
many attributes of ownership and most terms of the agreement are
more typical of a secured loan than a sale. For example, exposure to
the risk of price fluctuations is a strong indicium of ownership that
remains with the seller.5 The seller's obligation to repurchase the
should contain a clause providing that if the repo be considered a secured loan, the
parties intend to effect a security interest. See Dunning, Drafting Repurchase and
Reverse Repurchase Agreements, in Practising Law Institute, Repurchase and Re-
verse Repurchase Agreements 183, 188 (1982) (Course Handbook Series No. 290).
54. See Dauphin Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3-5 (evading restriction on
loans); PSA Survey, supra note 2, at 17; cf. First American Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (sale characterization to
avoid tax); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 116, 118 (6th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); American Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 421 F.2d 442, 451-52 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970);
SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (circumventing regulation).
55. Repo market participants are typically large financial institutions and govern-
mental authorities. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 330 (statement of
Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); id. at 340
(statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the
Pub. Sec. Ass'n); Volcker Letter II, supra note 12, at 1.
56. See American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 451-52 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426
F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
57. Report of the Division of Investment Management of the Securities and Ex-
change Comm. Concerning Advertising and Promotional Practices of Money Market
Funds Investing in Securities Issued by United States Government Sponsored Agen-
cies and the Purchase of Repurchase Agreements Collateralized by such Securities 6
(1982); M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 417; see United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296,
300 n.4 (7th Cir.) (repo is secured loan for tax purposes), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979); First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam) (same); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118
(6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970). But see Gilmore v. State Bd. of
Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Even if a repo is economi-
cally a secured loan, a repo may still be a purchase and sale of securities within the
meaning of the federal securities laws, Extract of Minutes, at 41, Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A. v. Drysdale Securities Corp., No. 82-6621 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1984); see
First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 676 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981), because
even the transfer of a security interest may constitute a sale for purposes of the federal
securities laws, see Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 431 (1981). Whether a repo
is itself a security is beyond the scope of this Note.
58. Hinkle Northwest, Inc. v. SEC, 641 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1981); First
Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
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securities at a specified price insulates the buyer from any risk of
market fluctuations. 59
The price structure of the transaction further supports a loan char-
acterization. Ordinarily, in a sale of securities, the price is the fair
market value. 60 In a repurchase agreement, however, the market
value of the securities generally exceeds the purchase price.(" This
discrepancy between the market price of the securities and the
amount of money initially transferred is typical of a secured loan.62
The excess value, or margin, serves as a cushion against adverse
market shifts should the buyer-lender need to liquidate the security in
the event of default. 63 The determination of the repurchase price also
supports a loan characterization. The price of securities to be pur-
The allocation of risk has been the most important factor for determining the
characterization of a repo for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. The tax issue
arises when the underlying security is a municipal bond. First Am. Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1100 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). If the buyer-lender
owns the bond, the interest is excluded from income under I.R.C. § 103 (1976). 467
F.2d at 1099-100. If the seller-borrower owns the bond, the coupon payments are
simply interest on a loan which is includible in gross income. Id. at 1101. These
interest payments are not deductible under I.R.C. § 265 because the loan is used to
carry a tax-exempt investment. The circuit courts addressing this issue have unani-
mously treated repos as loans for tax purposes, concluding that they are attempts to
circumvent § 265. Id. The courts considered risk allocation the critical element for
determining the economic substance of the transaction. Id. at 1102.
59. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); R. Edmister, Financial Institutions 442
(1980); see First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 675 (5th Cir. 1981)
(gain or loss accrues to seller-borrower). If the original seller had an option rather
than an obligation to repurchase the securities, each party would be exposed to
significant risk and a sale characterization might be appropriate. In American Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970), the
seller-borrower's exercise of the options regardless of market conditions, id. at 450,
led the court to conclude that there was no reallocation of risk, id. at 453. Such an
option, it has been pointed out, would likely make a repo an unattractive investment
vehicle because it would significantly increase its risk. See Walters v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. (In re Financial Corp.), 1 Bankr. 522, 526 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1979), afj'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1980).
60. W. Sharpe, supra note 1, at 23; M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 421.
61. M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 400; see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell,
657 F.2d 668, 675 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 469-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 1151,
1152 (W.D. Tenn. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
62. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); M. Stigum, supra note
2, at 421.
63. ICI Memorandum, supra note 28, at 6-8; see SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465,
469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (testimony of Mark
Stalnecker, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't of the Treasury).
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chased at a future date is ordinarily based on expectations regarding
future market price,6 4 whereas in a repo, the repurchase price is based
on the initial sale price. 65 In fact, the most hotly-negotiated term in a
repo is neither the purchase price nor the repurchase price, but rather
the spread between the two.6 16 This spread is invariably calculated in
terms of interest rates. 7 The pricing framework thus implies that a
repo is a loan and not a sale.
Repurchase agreements also typically contain a "mark-to-market"
provision" requiring the seller to transfer additional securities if the
market value of the original securities declines below a specified
amount.69 This provision further insulates the buyer from the risk of
default. Such a margining practice is characteristic of a secured loan,
but inconsistent with a sale.7 °
The right to interest on a security is another indication of owner-
ship. 71 In a repo, the seller-borrower usually retains the right to the
interest that accrues on the security during the period of the repo. 72
64. W. Sharpe, supra note 1, at 417; see E. Elton & M. Gruber, Modern Portfolio
Theory and Investment Analysis 442 (1981).
65. M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 399; see S. Goldfeld & L. Chandler, supra note 7,
at 462; L. Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 7, at 118 n.1.
66. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67. Id.; see Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); L. Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 7, at 118 n.1; M. Stigum, supra note 2,
at 399; Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 3. The overnight repo rate tends to
track the federal funds rate, see M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 407, suggesting that the
spread represents the time value of money, see id. at 396. Federal funds are unse-
cured interbank loans of reserves. See id. at 407. Due to the secured nature of a repo,
the rate on repos is usually slightly below the federal funds rate. Id. Since the
Lombard-Wall decision, however, this spread has narrowed. Bankruptcy Reform
Hearing, supra note 3, at 313 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); PSA Release, supra note 19, at 1.
68. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see Dunning, supra
note 53, at 190.
69. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see Union Planters
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827
(1970); Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 3.
70. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 421; see Novikoff & Julis,
Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements under Articles 8 & 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, in Practising Law Institute, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase
Agreements 79, 89 (1982) (Course Handbook Series No. 290).
71. M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 421 (buyer of security receives interest payment);
see also Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1980)
(ownership includes right to enjoy property).
72. Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 507 F.
Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1981); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (testimony of Mark Stalnecker, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't of the Treasury); Bankruptcy Implications, supra note
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The retention of this right suggests that a repo is not a sale. Moreover,
in the event of default by the seller-borrower, the buyer-lender has the
right to liquidate the security. The buyer-lender, however, ordinarily
must forward any excess of the liquidation price over the repurchase
price to the seller-borrower. 73 Such a transfer of sale proceeds is
hardly consistent with the characterization of the buyer-lender as
owner of the securities. Rather, this disposition of sale proceeds is
typical of a secured transaction with the holder of collateral seeking to
satisfy a secured claim. 74
Although these typical repo provisions indicate that the economic
impact of the transaction is that of a secured loan, two limited owner-
ship rights pass to the buyer-lender, suggesting that a repo might be a
sale. In a typical collateralized loan, the lender has only a limited
right to use, 75 and no right to sell the collateral. 76 In a repo, however,
the buyer-lender ordinarily has the right to repledge or resell the
securities.77
The buyer-lender's right to sell the securities unencumbered by any
rights of the seller-borrower is a powerful indicium of ownership. 78
This right, however, is subject to an obligation to substitute compara-
ble securities of equal market value. 79 The ability to substitute suggests
3, at 20. Even where the buyer-lender receives the coupons, they are considered
interest on a loan. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (6th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115,
116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); American Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 421 F.2d 442, 452-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
73. See M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 422; Kurtz Affidavit, supra note 49, at 3; Bar
Proceedings, supra note 20, at 35. But see Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States,
426 F.2d 115, 117 n.3 (6th Cir.) (buyer kept excess), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827
(1970); Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (same).
74. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 449 F. Supp. 538,
541 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l
Bank, 374 F. Supp. 904, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1977).
75. U.C.C. § 9-207(4) (1977).
76. See Novikoff & Julis, supra note 70, at 87-88. The secured party may dispose
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner following default. U.C.C. § 9-
504 (1977).
77. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gilmore v. State Bd. of
Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bankruptcy Implications,
supra note 3, at 3; Letter from Theodore Gewertz, Esq. to Hon. Edward Ryan 2
(Sept. 21, 1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). The repo in Lombard-
Wall did not give the buyer-lender the right to resell and repledge the securities,
arguably limiting the scope of the Lombard-Wall holding. Id.
78. See Hinkle Northwest v. SEC, 641 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1981); Energy
Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1980); 6 American
Law of Property § 26.1 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
79. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gilmore v. State Bd. of
Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bankruptcy Implications,
supra note 3, at 3.
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that the seller-borrower does not have a continuing ownership interest
in the property but merely a contract right to purchase similar secur-
ities.8 0 The right to sell the collateral allows the buyer-lender to
speculate in the securities market."' This risk, however, is independent
of the repo's market risk allocation, which remains with the seller-
borrower, 82 who must repurchase at a specified price regardless of
market conditions.
The economic substance of the transaction thus strongly suggests
that a repo is a secured loan, but a loan characterization has deleteri-
ous effects on the repurchase market. Because of the potential ramifi-
cations of the repo controversy on the financial markets, the clash
between bankruptcy policy and economic policy must be examined.
B. Bankruptcy Policy versus Economic Policy
A tension exists between economic policy and bankruptcy policy.
Bankruptcy policy favors the broadest application of the automatic
stay provision and thus the characterization of repos as loans. Eco-
nomic policy, on the other hand, favors a sale characterization, which
would minimize the disruptive effect of a repo market participant's
bankruptcy on the market.
The automatic stay is one of the Code's fundamental protections.8 3
It should be applied broadly to give "breathing space" to the bank-
rupt, enabling it to reorganize. The stay prevents the estate from
being torn apart in a disorderly "first-come, first-serve" liquidation. 84
Accordingly, bankruptcy policy favors a loan characterization be-
80. See ICI Memorandum, supra note 28, at 13.
81. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). For example,
the buyer-lender may resell the securities in the market hoping to reaquire them at a
lower price when he is required to sell them to the seller-borrower to fulfill the repo
obligation. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Mark Stalnecker, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't of the Treasury).
82. See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); R. Edmister, supra note 59, at 442.
83. In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 12
Bankr. 796, 798 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981); In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12
Bankr. 989, 997 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); 1978 Senate Report, supra note 41, at 54,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5840; 1977 House Report, supra
note 20, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6296-97.
84. In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1983); Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g
Co., 707 F.2d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706
F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983); 1978 Senate Report, supra note 41, at 54-55, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5840-41; 1977 House Report, supra note 20,
at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6296-97; Bankruptcy
Implications, supra note 3, at 12.
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cause the securities would then be considered property of the estate
and subject to the automatic stay. 85
The economic substance of the transaction and the Code's policy
must be considered in light of the impact a loan characterization
would have on the repurchase market. The repurchase market is large
and complex86 with daily transactions conservatively estimated at
$150 billion.8 7 Repos are usually of very short duration."" Their low
risk combined with their unique flexibility as to amount and maturity
allow repos to serve the varying needs of a broad range of institu-
tions. 89
The Federal Reserve uses repos as an important tool to implement
monetary policy through manipulation of monetary reserves. 90 Repos
allow very large, rapid interventions without the market disruption or
risk that would accompany outright sales and purchases of govern-
ment securities. 91 Consequently, any contraction of the repurchase
85. See Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983); In
re Adams, 27 Bankr. 582, 583 (Bankr. D. Del. 1983); 1978 Senate Report, supra note
41, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5835; 1977 House
Report, supra note 20, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6296-97; Application for Order, supra note 9, at 2; J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 24, at 993; Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 12.
86. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 337-38 (statement of Thomas
W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency See. Div. of the Pub. See. Ass'n) ("the
largest capital market in the world"); Welles, supra note 1, at 78 ("[T]he government
market has become an almost infinitely complex circuitry of [repos] .....
87. M. Stigum, supra note 2, at 395; Welles, supra note 1, at 78.
88. See S. Goldfeld & L. Chandler, supra note 7, at 246; L. Ritter & W. Silber,
supra note 7, at 118 n. 1. Due to the liquidity risks currently associated with repos,
the duration has shortened to reduce the likelihood of default. See PSA Survey, supra
note 2, app. at 25, 31. The duration of repos is usually less than one week. S.
Goldfeld & L. Chandler, supra note 7, at 246; L. Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 7, at
118 n.1; Volcker Letter II, supra note 12, at 1.
89. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 339-40, 344 (statement of
Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency See. Div. of the Pub. See.
Ass'n); see SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bankruptcy
Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 310 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Volcker Letter II, supra note 12, at 1.
90. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bankruptcy
Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 310 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); id. at 339 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss,
Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n); Volcker Letter I,
supra note 12, reprinted in Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 305; L.
Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 7, at 210-11; Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3,
at 4.
91. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 310-11 (statement of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); see Letter from
Rep. Walter E. Fauntroy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs to Hon. Peter W. Rodino,
[Vol. 52
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
market, due to fears of liquidity problems arising from the bankruptcy
of a repo counterparty, would impair the Federal Reserve's ability to
implement monetary policy.92 This deep and smoothly functioning
market facilitates the Fed's ability to make investments on behalf of
foreign central banks. 93 Moreover, an efficient repo market increases
foreign demand for government securities and thus lowers the cost of
financing the national debt.9 4
Repurchase agreements also provide a major source of funding for
government securities dealers.9 5 The Treasury relies heavily on these
dealers to absorb new government debt issues.9 Any limitation on
dealers' ability to obtain financing would increase the Treasury's cost
of borrowing. 7 Any increase in the dealers' cost of financing would
exert upward pressure on the interest rate bid by dealers on new
Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (June 29, 1983) (available in files of
Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Fauntroy Letter].
92. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 311-12, 314 (statement of
Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Volcker
Letter I, supra note 12, reprinted in Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at
305; Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 7-8; cf. Fauntroy Letter, supra note 91, at 1
(broad-based participation necessary).
93. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 331 (statement of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
94. Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Federal Reserve's Motion to Inter-
vene as Amicus Curiae and Brief as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, In re Lombard-Wall,
Inc., 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Fed. Brief],
reprinted in Practising Law Institute, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agree-
ments 320-21 (1982) (Course Handbook Series No. 290).
95. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 311 (statement of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); M. Stigum, supra
note 2, at 40-41; Welles, supra note 1, at 78; see SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 340 (statement of
Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency See. Div. of the Pub. Sec.
Ass'n); Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (testimony of Mark Stalnecker, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't of the Treasury); Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 2,
5; Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 4.
96. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bankruptcy
Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 311-12 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive
Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 3
(testimony of Mark Stalnecker, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't of the Trea-
sury).
97. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 311-12 (statement of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); id. at 343-44
(statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the
Pub. See. Ass'n); Letter from Roger W. Mehle, Ass't Sec'y (Domestic Fin.), Dep't of
the Treasury, to Hon. Robert J. Dole Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (March 16, 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Mehle Letter]; see also Fauntroy Letter, supra note 91,
at 1-2 (repos crucial to the financing of the public debt).
1984] 843
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
issues. 8 Further, any reduction in the primary dealers' capacity to
absorb new debt would compel the Treasury to deal with more buy-
ers, thereby raising underwriting costs.99 Given the burgeoning gov-
ernment deficits, 00 even a minor increase in financing costs would
impose a substantial fiscal burden on the Treasury.
The repurchase market also provides institutions with an attractive
opportunity to invest their cash balances on a day-to-day basis.' 0'
Such investments direct short-term funds to their area of greatest need
at a low cost, thereby improving the overall efficiency of the financial
markets and the economy. 0 2 Timely performance of the seller's obli-
gation to repurchase is critical to these institutions, 0 3 which require
the funds to meet other financial obligations. Thus, subjecting the
securities to the automatic stay would discourage these institutions
from investing in the repo market, thereby reducing the liquidity of
the market.10 4
Most ominously, if a major market participant fails, highly-
leveraged dealer counterparts might also fail because the automatic
stay might tie up so much capital that the dealers could not fulfill
their other financial obligations. 05 Such "ripple" bankruptcies could
lead to a market crash.106 Prior failures have not led to such dire
98. See Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 6.
99. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 517-18 (statement of Invest-
ment Company Institute); id..at 311-12 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive
Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 6.
100. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1983, at DI, col. 3; Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1983, at
4, col. 1.
101. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y 1980); Bankruptcy
Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 515 (statement of Investment Company Institute);
id. at 340 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec.
Div. of the Pub. See. Ass'n); S. Goldfeld & L. Chandler, supra note 7, at 463 & n.12;
Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 4.
102. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 339 (statement of Thomas W.
Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. See. Ass'n); see id.
at 314-15 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y.); R. Edmister, supra note 59, at 442 (low cost).
103. ICI Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5; see Bankruptcy Re-
form Hearing, supra note 3, at 515-17 (statement of Investment Company Institute);
see also Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 5 (ability to liquidate securities
part of repo's attraction).
104. See Fed. Brief, supra note 94, reprinted in Practising Law Institute, Repur-
chase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements 321 (1982) (Course Handbook Series No.
290); Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 9; ICI Supplemental Memorandum, supra
note 12, at 20.
105. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 341 (statement of Thomas
W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n);
Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 9; Welles, supra note 1, at 73-74.
106. Goldman Brief, supra note 28, at 9; see Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra
note 3, at 341 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency
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consequences. In the Drysdale collapse, Chase Manhattan Bank reluc-
tantly assumed Drysdale's repurchase obligations, thus stemming an
incipient market panic.'0 7 Fortunately, the Lombard-Wall default
occurred at the onset of a major bull market, which allowed time for
an orderly reorganization.'0 8 The trustee was able to delay payment
and retain adequate resources to satisfy repo counterparts.' 0 9 In the
future, however, adverse market movements may require prompt
liquidation to avert financial catastrophe." 0
Code policy and the economic substance of the transaction suggest
that repos should be treated as loans. Thus, it is likely that bankruptcy
courts will treat repos as secured loans, despite the possible impact of
such a characterization on the repo market. The severe threat posed to
the economy by the the automatic stay warrants ameliorative legisla-
tion exempting repo participants from the operation of the stay."'
III. PRoPosEn BELIEF
In 1982, Congress exempted securities contracts of stockbrokers and
clearing agencies from the automatic stay and preferences provi-
sion. 1 2 Although Congress sought to protect the sensitive and volatile
securities markets,"13 the scope of these technical amendments is lim-
ited. 14 Legislation has since been introduced to exempt repos in gov-
ernment securities, bankers' acceptances, or certificates of deposit
See. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n); Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of
Sen. D'Amato, Subcomm. Chairman); Welles, sapra note 1, at 74.
107. See Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Sen. D'Amato, Sub-
comm. Chairman); id. at 25-28 (statement of Anthony Solomon, President, Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Welles, supra note 1, at 74; Wall St. J., May 20, 1982, at 4,
col. 1. But see Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 5-7 (testimony of Mark Stalnecker,
Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Fed. Fin., Dep't of the Treasury) (market would continue to
function without payments by Chase).
108. Bar Proceedings, supra note 20, at 39, 41; Masters, Good Lawyering and
Good Luck Aid Company's Reorganization, Legal Times of N.Y., Nov. 22, 1982, at
6, col. 1.
109. Bar Proceedings, supra note 20, at 39, 41; Masters, supra note 108, at 6, col.
1.
110. See 128 Cong. Rec. 8133 (daily ed. July 13, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole);
Russo Letter, supra note 3, at 2.
111. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 344 (statement of Thomas
W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n);
Fauntroy Letter, supra note 91, at 2; Volcker Letter II, supra note 12, at 2.
112. Bankruptcy Act Amendments, P.L. No. 97-222, 96 Stat. 236 (1982) (current
version at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 555-556 (West Supp. 1983)).
113. 1982 House Report, supra note 35, at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 585; 128 Cong. Rec. 8133 (daily ed. July 13, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Dole); see Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 8.
114. See Bankruptcy Implications, supra note 3, at 8; Fauntroy Letter, supra note
91, at 1 (scope insufficient to protect market).
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from the automatic stay and preferences provisions.",5 The securities
markets' volatility and repo dealers' high degree of leverage justify this
legislation, because prompt liquidation is necessary to the orderly
functioning of the market.
The proposed legislation would promote an efficient and stable
repurchase market, thereby serving vital economic interests. Nonethe-
less, critics have advanced several arguments against the legislation.
First, they claim that the magnitude of the threat to the market is
overstated."16 The Drysdale incident, however, demonstrates the mar-
ket's potential fragility. Drysdale defaulted on approximately $300
million in interest payments." 7 Had Chase Manhattan not satisfied
Drysdale's obligations, widespread financial chaos could have
erupted."" Moreover, default of even a small dealer poses a substan-
115. PSA Survey, supra note 2, at 2-3; e.g., H.R. 3418, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
Cong. Rec. E3185 (daily ed. June 27, 1983); 129 Cong. Rec. H2524-25 (daily ed.
May 2, 1983) (introduction of Bankruptcy Code Amendments to assure continued use
of repos); S. 1013, title V, F, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. 373 (daily ed.
Apr. 27, 1983). The proposed amendments passed the Senate. 129 Cong. Rec. 5364,
5388 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983). This legislation has received unanimous support from
financial institutions. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 307 (testimony of
Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Securities Div. of the Pub.
Securities Ass'n); see id. at 518 (statement of Investment Company Institute); Faunt-
roy Letter, supra note 91, at 2; Volcker Letter I, supra note 12, reprinted in
Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 305. The only opposition has come
from the Treasury Department. See Mehle Letter, supra note 97, at 1. Passage has
been delayed by an unrelated controversy regarding the structure of the bankruptcy
courts. See Public Securities Ass'n Memorandum Regarding Proposed Repo Bank-
ruptcy Amendments 2 (May 10, 1983); Fauntroy Letter, supra note 91, at 2. This
delay has stymied efforts by government securities dealers to counteract the deleteri-
ous effects of the Drysdale and Lombard-Wall defaults. PSA Release, supra note 19,
at 1. The continuing uncertainties about how repos will be treated has magnified the
difficulties of negotiating written repurchase agreements. See id. at 2. One congress-
man has stated that "[t]he delay in passage of this legislation is a ticking time bomb
for the Government securities market." Id. at 3 (quoting Rep. Glickman).
116. Mehle Letter, supra note 97, at 1-2.
117. Welles, supra note 1, at 74.
118. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 25-28 (statement of Anthony Solomon,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Welles, supra note 1, at 74; Wall St. J., May
20, 1982, at 4, col. 1. Chase Manhattan Bank had acted as a clearing agent for
Drysdale's transactions. Drysdale's counterparties, therefore, were not informed that
they had entered into a repo with Drysdale. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 23-24
(statement of Anthony Solomon, President Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Federal
Reserve Bank of N.Y., A Report on Drysdale and Other Recent Problems of Firms
Involved in the Government Securities Market 3 (1982); M. Stigum, supra note 2, at
401. Although Chase Manhattan denied its obligation as a principal, see Welles,
supra note 1, at 81, it paid Drysdale's obligations, in part to stave off a market panic.
Wall St. J., May 20, 1982, at 4, col. 1. The default involving $300 million would
have been a major blow to the repo market. Welles, supra note 1, at 74; Wall St. J.,
May 20, 1982, at 4, col. 1. The effect would have been magnified had Drysdale's $10
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tial threat to the market" 9 due to repo dealers' high degree of lever-
age.12 0 Second, critics argue that there is no proof that market con-
traction or rate increases will result from fear of the automatic stay. 12'
Although it is difficult to isolate the impact of any single event on the
financial markets, some major institutions have left the market in
response to the increased risk associated with a loan characteriza-
tion. 122 This trend towards market erosion has been forestalled, to
some extent, by the expectation that Congress will enact legislative
relief. 12 3 If such legislation is not forthcoming, more participants can
be expected to leave the market. Statistics also indicate that dealers
have been relying on more expensive bank loans for more of their
inventory financing needs, 2 4 exerting upward pressure on interest
rates. 25
Critics maintain further that the proposed legislation inequitably
favors repo participants over other secured creditors. 2 6 Although the
legislation provides special protection to repo participants, this benefit
is incidental to the primary goal of safeguarding a critical financial
billion in assets not been liquidated, Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of
Anthony Solomon, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.), but instead frozen in a
bankruptcy court. See id. at 25.
119. Russo Letter, supra note 3, at 1.
120. SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Welles, supra
note 1, at 73-74.
121. See Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, List of Treasury Concerns with
Repo Bankruptcy Amendments that may be Raised at Fed Meeting November 29,
1982 at 1 (Nov. 29, 1982) (internal memorandum) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review).
122. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 342-43 (statement of
Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency See. Div. of the Pub. See.
Ass'n); id. at 516 (statement of Investment Company Institute); id. at 312 (statement
of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); Memoran-
dum from Alfred P. Johnson to Mark Mackey, Ass't General Counsel, Investment
Company Institute 1 (Nov. 22, 1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Johnson Memorandum]; PSA Release, supra note 19, at 1.
123. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 516 (statement of Invest-
ment Company Institute); id. at 314 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); id. at 342 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss,
Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency See. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n).
124. Id. at 343 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed.
Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n); Johnson Memorandum, supra note 122, at
2.
125. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 315 (statement of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.); id. at 342-44
(statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the
Pub. See. Ass'n)
126. Mehle Letter, supra note 97, at 1.
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market.12 7 This overriding goal suggests, however, that the coverage
of the legislation should be limited to major established markets.2 8
Critics contend that the increased risk associated with a loan char-
acterization is desirable because it promotes rigorous credit analysis,
thereby preventing weak firms from obtaining too much credit. 129 The
current level of risk, however, is so great that it threatens to destroy or
severely erode the market. 130 The proposed legislation should be modi-
fied so that it reduces risk enough to ensure the market's smooth
functioning yet leaves sufficient risk to encourage careful credit analy-
sis by market participants. Moreover, the bankrupt should be pro-
tected to the furthest extent consistent with the preservation of the
repo market.
The financial importance of the repo market warrants exempting
repo participants from the automatic stay and preferenced provisions.
Repo participants, however, should continue to be prohibited from
enforcing "ipso facto" clauses, which declare a party in default solely
on account of its bankruptcy.' 31 This proposal prevents a panicked
mass liquidation that could further undermine the bankrupt's posi-
tion, 132 because the counterparty has little incentive to act on the
estate's behalf once he has satisfied his own claim. The counterparty is
therefore unlikely to conduct his negotiations or time the liquidation
sale to the fluctuations of the market so as to maximize excess liquida-
tion proceeds. 133 The estate should be allowed to unwind its transac-
tion and to receive the benefit of its bargain as long as it fulfills its
financial obligations under the repo. Such modified legislation would
protect the repo markets without significantly undermining the Code
policy of protecting the estate and promoting reorganization.
127. Volcker Letter II, supra note 12, at 3.
128. Id. at 2. The proposed legislation is limited to the major markets in U.S.
government securities, bankers' acceptances and certificates of deposite. The legal
status of repos on other types of assets, such as commercial paper or commodities
would remain unchanged. See id.
129. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 315 (statement of Peter
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
130. See id.; id. at 337-38 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Cov't and
Fed. Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n).
131. This exception is analogous to the Code's treatment of executory contracts.
Although the trustee must ordinarily cure any default prior to assuming a contract,
11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982), he need not cure default on account of an "ipso facto" clause.
Id.
132. See Kurtz Affidavit, supra note 49, at 3-4. Moreover, preventing liquidation
protects the estate from being charged with the consequential costs of liquidation.
See U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a) (1977).
133. Id. at 3.
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The threat to counterparts of allowing the estate to close out the
transaction is minimal. The capital in the transaction would not be
frozen. Moreover, mark-to-market provisions could require the estate
to deliver additional collateral within one day should the value of the
collateral fall below a specified level. Such provisions would limit the
risk to those situations in which one-day market swings exceed the
requisite financial cushion. The continued presence of some risk and
the threat to reputation from involvement with an insolvent entity
should provide sufficient incentive for rigorous credit analyses.134
CONCLUSION
The uncertain characterization of a repo in the event of a partici-
pant's bankruptcy has placed a cloud over the repo market. 135 A repo
should be characterized as a secured loan and the securities subjected
to the Code's automatic stay. The severe effects of subjecting repo
participants to the automatic stay, however, could lead to widespread
bankruptcies of financial institutions and a collapse of the government
securities markets. Indeed, the mere possibility of application of the
automatic stay threatens to cause a significant contraction of the repo
markets. The critical financial importance of the repo market man-
dates legislation to exempt repo participants from the automatic stay.
This Note endorses the legislation introduced in Congress to rectify the
problem, with the proviso that repo participants should continue to be
stayed from enforcing "ipso facto" clauses. Such a compromise pro-
vides adequate protection to the repurchase market while giving the
estate an opportunity to unwind its transactions thereby facilitating
the bankrupt's reorganization.
Gary Walters
134. See Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 3, at 516 (statement of Invest-
ment Company Institute) (importance of investor confidence).
135. Id. at 337-38 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Gov't and Fed.
Agency Sec. Div. of the Pub. Sec. Ass'n); PSA Survey, supra note 2, at 1; see id. at 5,
7.
1984]
